Media Law Newsletter
     
Archive LEGAL UPDATE - JANUARY 2002

Victor Kermit Kiam II v MGN Ltd

Court of Appeal upholds "indecent" award - can we trust them to get it right in libel cases.
28 January 2002
Defamation; Damages

Summary:
The Court of Appeal has upheld (by a 2 - 1 majority) a jury award of £105,000 libel damages in favour of the late Victor Kiam.
Mr Kiam famed for his purchase of Remington - "I liked the razor so much, I bought the company" sued the Mirror over a City
Slicker's article, in essence, stating that he was going to close cigarette manufacturers Ronson. His skilful legal team managed to
persuade the jury that the article suggested, among other matters, that Kiam had lied about his promise to keep Ronson afloat and
had been unable to manage his financial affairs. The Court of Appeal assumed that the jury had found, as was open to them,
that the article was untrue in every respect and published maliciously and that the true position could have been easily ascertained
if the Slickers had checked their facts with Kiam or a number of others beforehand. In addition, shortly before the trial, the Mirror
published three further articles about Kiam which were relied on in aggravation of damages. At trial, although the Mirror accepted
that the article was false they maintained that it was not defamatory and suggested that Mr Kiam was unreasonable in seeking large
sums of money from the jury. The judge had advised the jury that an award between £40,000 and £80,000 might be appropriate.

The Court of Appeal held that it would only reduce a jury's award if it was substantially in excess of any award that a reasonable
jury could have come up with. The fact that it was more than was recommended by the judge was not conclusive. The Court then
sought to compare the award to Mr Kiam with jury awards that it had considered in other cases and concluded that the award was
not excessive. Lord Justice Sedley gave a dissenting judgement in which he compared the jury's award to personal injury damages
and described it as "indecent". He would have reduced the award to £60,000.

Comment:
In the landmark decision of Elton John v MGN Ltd, Lord Bingham expressed the hope that the Court of Appeal decisions on
damages would provide a coherent body of authority to give some much needed predictability to this area of the law. It is very
difficult to see how this award to Mr Kiam could possibly fit into any coherent scheme for computing damages. No actual harm
was caused by the article. Indeed, it was barely defamatory - a possible explanation for the inclusion of an alternative claim in
malicious falsehood. The only sensible conclusion is that the jury included an element of punishment of the newspaper in its
supposedly compensatory award to Mr Kiam. The characteristically forceful dissenting judgment of Sedley LJ has much to
commend it. Indeed, it is a pity that so many of the best Court of Appeal judgments in libel claims seem to come from the
dissenting judge. It is not good enough for the Court of Appeal to trot out the usual criticism of defamation practitioners for
the state of the law of libel - don't they bear some responsibility?

Links
Guardian comment


Vanessa Feltz v The Mirror, Sunday Mirror

Celebrities can forfeit right to privacy
17 July 2001
PCC Complaints; Privacy

Summary:
The Mirror and Sunday Mirror ran three articles claiming that Vanessa Feltz was having a relationship with Fitzroy Charles,
and helpfully informing their readers of some of the more intimate details. Feltz complained to the Press Complaints Commission
of breaches of clauses 1 (accuracy) and 3 (privacy) of the PCC Code. She denied having any relationship with Charles, having
only known him in a business context. The newspapers argued that Feltz had prior to this inaccurately denied having a relationship
with her previous boyfriend, and also claimed that the story had been corroborated by Charles. They claimed that it was not
unreasonable to publish his version of events. With regard to privacy, the newspapers argued that Feltz was "a celebrity of her
own making", and that it was inevitable that newspapers would show an interest in her private life, given that she had placed it
in the public domain in intimate detail.

The PCC rejected Feltz's complaint on both counts. On the inaccuracy complaint, the PCC typically ducked the issue. It
recognised that the newspapers had believed that Feltz had not been honest about previous relationships and pointed out
that she had not complained about an article published in January 2001 which alleged that she had apologised for misleading
Mirror journalists. Also taken into account was the fact that it was Charles' side of the story that had been presented to the
reader. However, there was no finding as to whether Feltz had had a relationship with him. On the more important issue of privacy,
it was accepted that the articles contained personal details. However, the Commission made it clear that it would not accede to
complaints where the Complainant had herself discussed similar matters in the public domain, or where she had not complained
about similar stories that appeared. "Privacy is a right which can be compromised and those who talk about their private lives on
their own terms must expect that there will be others who will do so, without their consent, in a less than agreeable way". Also
taken into account was that Charles' right to freedom of expression was under threat; the private details published were proportionate to
those that had been previously published and the stories were balanced by the denials of Miss Feltz.


Comment:
She who lives by the sword shall die by the sword. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the balance struck by the PCC in this case,
it reflects the obviously sensible principle that if you disclose details of your private life in the media you inevitably compromise your
ability to prevent others doing so, in circumstances outside your control. Whether the extent to which the right to a private life is
compromised by voluntarily making revelations in the press is a question of degree. The PCC is not willing to allow celebrities to
retain control of their private lives in the public domain. Celebrities intending to give interviews to the press about their private lives
(usually earning a tidy sum in the process) should be wary of the extent to which they will be signing away their privacy in the process.
It remains to be seen to what extent the courts will uphold a right to privacy in such circumstances. Whilst there have been a
number of out of court settlements of actions brought based on breach of privacy, this area of law remains essentially untested.

Links
PCC report in full

Back to Top

Prime Minister and Mrs Blair v The Daily Telegraph; Daily Mail
Yet another PCC success for the Blairs - Complaint over Euan upheld
8 December 2001
Privacy; Children

Summary:
An article was published in the Daily Telegraph and followed up in the Daily Mail regarding Euan Blair's application to Oxford
University's Trinity College. The Blairs complained that the articles breached Clause 6 of the Press Complaints Commission's
Code which prohibits (i) unnecessary intrusions into the school life of children and (ii) articles written about children solely because
of the position of their parents. The PCC upheld the complaints, noting the important matter of principle raised by this complaint
and that it would set a precedent. It took into account the anxiety Euan would have been suffering, being merely an applicant
rather than having been offered a place and the fact that the articles could have damaged both his education and welfare. It
concluded that the intrusion was not necessary, since the article was concerned with Euan's choice of college, rather than
with the public debate over the admissions policies of Oxbridge colleges (not mentioned in the articles). The PCC regarded
any public interest in disclosing such information to be only defensible if "so exceptional" as to override the normally paramount
interests of the child. If the choices of the Blairs or their children were at odds with government policy or any public statement by
the family, there might be justification for publishing the story. That was not the case here. Furthermore, it might be conceivable
that a national newspaper would report on the outcome of an individual's applications to university, but not on the mere fact of the
application itself. The articles about Euan would not have appeared if not for the status of his parents, and there was a breach of the
PCC Code in this respect as well.

Comment:
Is it possible for the Blairs or the Royal family to lose a complaint to the PCC? There was nothing confidential about Euan's
application and it is difficult to see how the publicity would put him under any additional pressure than that arising ordinarily
from his father's position. It may be no more than a co-incidence that Michael Beloff QC, the Master of Trinity College is a
close and long-standing friend of the Blairs. In any event, the public debate over the allocation of university places is a live one,
and whether or not it was explicitly referred to in the articles is immaterial - the right of the public to non-confidential information
about the education of the PM's children should prevail.

(1) Russell English (2) James Truselle v (1) Hastie Publishing Limited (2) Peter Hastie
Another QP defence bites the dust
31 January 2002
Defamation; Qualified Privilege

Summary:
Both Claimants were insurance underwriters. Truselle worked for a company called Trenwick. They sued the Insurance Insider,
a specialist publication to the insurance community, published by Hastie Publishing and edited by Peter Hastie. The offending
article reported that a writ had been issued claiming against Trenwick for "unlawful interference and breach of contract", going
on to allege that Russell English had resigned from Trenwick and Truselle had been suspended pending the outcome of a
disciplinary enquiry against him. In this libel action English and Truselle alleged that the article accused them of unlawfully
interfering in the business of Fairmont and wrongfully diverting £200,000. The Defendants relied on a Reynolds based defence
of qualified privilege, contending that the article raised issues of legitimate interest to the insurance community and that there
was a duty to report such information. In particular they relied on the fact that they had merely reported defamatory allegations
made by others and had not endorsed them. Reliance was placed on a recent Court of Appeal decision in Al Fagih v H H Saudi
Research and Marketing Limited (5 November 2001) - a case reporting on a spat between two politicians, where one politician
sued on allegations made by the other in the newspaper. It was decided that privilege was available despite the failure of a
newspaper to approach the Claimant for his comment prior to publication, and recognised that the newspaper had been engaged
in 'reportage' - reporting allegations of one politician without in any way adopting them. Reference was also made to the European
Court of Human Rights decision in Thoma v Luxembourg which could be interpreted as suggesting that a journalist should not be
found liable for reporting a defamatory allegation, unless he adopts it or otherwise suggests that it is true.

Gray J. noted that the facts of this case were different than in Al Fagih, where the newspaper had been reporting on a slanging
match between protagonists for some weeks - and was entitled to assume that the complainant in that case would counter-attack
shortly after the report they had published about him appeared. Neither Al-Fagih or Thoma was authority for the proposition that
privilege covered the mere reporting of allegations, even if those allegations were not adopted by the newspaper. In any event he
recognised that the jury in this case had concluded that the newspaper had indeed adopted the allegations. Another distinguishing
feature from Al-Fagih was that the political dimension that existed there was absent. Gray J. went through the ten Reynolds criteria,
finding that: the article made serious allegations against the Claimants, but was not of general public interest; was based on
information sent anonymously to the newspaper - not a reliable source; that not much was done to verify the truth of the information
(the jury had resolved certain factual disputes as to the research allegedly carried out by Hastie against him); there was no real
urgency for publication; and no comment was sought from the Claimants. In the circumstances the judge ruled that the article
did not attract qualified privilege. The jury awarded the Claimants £10,000 each.

Back to Top

Comment:
The case displays the tension that appears to have arisen between first instance judges such as Gray J. and Eady J. (who have
substantial direct experience of libel) and the Court of Appeal. By confining the Court of Appeal's decision in Al-Fagih to its particular
facts, Gray J. appears to be closing off any general application of the Reynolds defence to "reportage". The judge makes the fair
point that Parliament in the Defamation Act 1996 has set out categories of report specifically protected by qualified privilege.
Where the media step beyond the statutory categories all the other elements of Reynolds must be satisfied before a defence of
qualified privilege is to succeed. It is not sufficient for a defendant merely to show that he is reporting someone else's allegations
without in any way adopting them.


Glory Anne Clibbery v Ivan William Allan & Anor
Report of proceedings in the Family Division could be published once the case was over, even if heard in private.
30 January 2002
Reporting of Cases

Summary:
This was an appeal from the refusal of a judge to continue injunctions restraining Clibbery from disclosing information obtained
during the course of family proceedings. The judge had decided that confidentiality did not attach to proceedings merely because
they took place behind closed doors.

The Court of Appeal ruled that this was a question impinging on the right to freedom of expression. Any ban had to be
"objectively justified" - in the European Convention on Human Rights sense - open justice would be derogated from only so
far as was strictly necessary. Just because the public had been excluded from a hearing did not mean there would be a ban
on later publication. Whilst information about children was indisputably covered by privacy and secrecy and no information
could be disclosed after the end of the case without leave of the court, there were other proceedings, such as the present
that concerned distribution of property, that were not automatically covered by secrecy although they had been heard in
private. Whether or not they were protected depended on whether there was a statutory restriction on doing so or whether
to do so would adversely affect the administration of justice. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(the right to a fair trial) did not require all cases to be heard in open court. As always, it was a balancing exercise between
the right to privacy under Article 8 and freedom of expression under Article 10. There was no ground in the present case
upon which there could not be publication of the proceedings, and the appeal was dismissed.


Comment:
The 'dirty linen' that often gets washed in the course of family proceedings is not necessarily protected from court reporting.
Going into litigation requires one to be prepared for the facts to come out, and Article 10 - the right to freedom of expression,
will often prevail.


Graham Baldwin v (1) Alan Rusbridger and (2) Guardian Newspapers Limited
Guardian Lose Second Libel Action
31 January 2002
Defamation


Summary:
On 21 November 1998 The Guardian published an article entitled "Anti-Cult Man Wins Libel Case" which reported the
Claimant's success in a libel action against the newspaper that he had won the day before. The article expressed
support for the journalists who had written the original article and called the article "responsible and careful".
The Claimant felt that the article questioned the verdict in the earlier libel case and was seeking to maintain that the
original allegations were true. The newspaper, whilst agreeing to pay the Claimant damages and costs, asserted
that they had not intended to question the earlier verdict, nor to assert that the original allegations were true.
They undertook not to repeat the allegations.


Eugenia Williams v (1) Colin Myler (2) MGN Ltd

Lewis Boxing Judge Wins Libel Damages
25 January 2002
Defamation

Summary:
Williams was a judge of professional boxing matches, and brought actions against the editor and publisher of the
Sunday Mirror. On 21 March 1999 the Sunday Mirror published a front page article and further reports under the
headline "Secret £20,000 of Lewis Fight Judge" and "Riddle of Bankrupt Boxing Judge Eugenia and Secret £20,000".
The articles alleged that Williams had two secret bank accounts containing £20,000 between them and linked the
money with the then recent world heavyweight title boxing match between Lewis and Evander Holyfield which she
had judged. Williams had alleged that the articles suggested that there was an illicit connection between the money
and her having unexpectedly adjudged the match to be a draw.

By the statement in open court Williams said that she did not have any secret bank accounts, and the allegations
were untrue. She was distressed and her reputation was damaged by the claims. The Sunday Mirror acknowledged
that the allegations were false, apologised and undertook not to repeat them, paying Williams undisclosed
damages and legal costs.

Back to Top


Back to top